July 08, 2004
And Dubya Fiddled While the U.S. Army Burned
What will it take? What will it take before the continuing failure of leadership from the Bush Administration, and Bush personally as Command-n-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, falls upon the American people and U.S. Army and Guard & Reserve like a hurricane?
A strong category 5 monster building in the South Atlantic, threatening, but then lingering, then threatening, then finally making landfall, spreading chaos and destruction in wide unrelenting swaths across an innocent land. Is that the magnitude of disaster it would take before America wakes up and rids itself of this embarrassingly incompetent Republican Administration?
Members of Congress (mostly democrats) and military experts within and without Pentagon are troubled by the increasingly clear fact that the U.S. Army is being strained by extended tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. More than half of the Army's 33 active duty combat brigades are serving in those countries (mostly in Iraq) or preparing to deploy there (see NPR.org / Morning Edition for a lengthy and interesting piece on this subject). They point to a looming crisis within the nation’s largest armed force and its reserve component. And yet the Bush Administration failing the leadership test again, declines to act decisively to avert certain disaster. Instead of making the hard choices—like growing the Army by at least two or more divisions—the Bush Administration calls in the Marines to perform a mission they are not designed to do; institutes morale-busting stop-loss measures; calls upon the inactive ready reserve; and continues to disrupt the lives of reservists in ever increasing numbers, pushing that institution to the breaking point. Despite all these measures designed to put more boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, the civilian leadership (and I use the term very loosely) at the Pentagon foolishly clings to the notion that there is no need to grow the standing Army.
It is doubtful, even at a cursory glance, that the U.S. Army could fight another major conflict, as called for in long standing U.S. military doctrine, with active duty troop strengths at its current level. I am left wondering, where is the disconnect? Why the resistance to doing what is right? Politics? Shame on Bush! Is it so hard for the Republican led Administration to admit that it was wrong to try and fight two conflicts without growing the Army in a substantial way? Is Rumsfled so hell-bent on proving his concept(s) of concentric warfare that he is willing to break the U.S. Army to do it? And are we, the American people so blinded by Administration political spin and fear-mongering that we are willing to stand by and let it happen?
I know it’s a dirty word for those who would love to continue to embrace the fantasy of a leaner, smaller Army of One to combat the “new” threat of the 21st century and beyond, but the draft is the only sensible way to alleviate the impending implosion of the U.S. Army and the Guard & Reserve system while fighting this set of wars. I roundly reject the notion that conscripts would be useless on the battlefield. Such an argument is an insult to all American men (and women), and paints them with a cloth of cowardice that is unwarranted and unsubstantiated. Will they not receive the same training as all Army soldiers? Conscripted or not, put a man in harms way and he will fight.
As a Veteran I am incensed that the once proud U.S. Army has been brought to this point by a civilian leadership that fails to lead with intelligence, wisdom, and foresight. This is clear failure of leadership. And once again Nero (Dubya) is fiddling while Rome burns and no one around him has the courage to tell the Emperor he has no clothes. Will we, the American people have the courage and wisdom to do so come November 2nd?
Don’t forget that the sorry state of the Army and Veteran’s Affairs should not come as a surprise to anyone. The estimates of what the Iraq War would do to our troop strength were very clear - even if they didn’t get more than a cursory play in our media. Imagine if we had actually tried to put the number of troops into Iraq that the studies (Army War College, State Department, General Shinseki, etc) said would be required, instead of 1/2-1/3 that number - the situation would have been even more untenable.
This Administration does not lead - it posits its intellectual, theoretical positions, then sticks to them regardless of what evidence is presented refuting it. That’s “Stong, Unwavering Leadership,” Bush-style.
Posted by: Gaelen Burns at July 8, 2004 01:30 PMA large standing army is partly to blame for where we are now. By the time Bush was asking Congress to authorize action in Iraq, boots were ALREADY massing in Kuwait preparing for the invasion, leaving Congresspersons with a choice of “supporting the troops” or “not supporting the troops”, rather than an honest assessment of the need for war, or lack thereof.
1. Marines are trained to do everything. Just ask them. ;)
2. Stop-loss is intended to fill manpower shortfalls.
3. IRR is also intended to fill manpower shortfalls.
4. The Reserves did not enlist for an extended vacation package. They enlisted to serve in times of war or national emergency. UNFORTUNATELY, due to the capacity handed to the President by a large standing army, this level of need has been generated artificially. But again, that IS what the Reserves are FOR.
The first phase of deviation from the “2MRC” doctrine of military readiness (Two Major Regional Conflicts of capability) came during the Clinton administration, and it was actually a good thing. It saved us a LOT of money—money which became a part of the economic solution rather than a part of the economic problem, in the nation at large. Fiscally conservative as I am, I see nothing there not to like.
Bush has simply continued the Clinton doctrine, albeit probably with less vision fiscally, and less of a backup plan strategically.
An additional factor to consider is that now that Iraq has a fledgling native government, it will steadily grow in capacity to stand on its own feet, and will require less and less American intervention to support it militarily. Over time, the requirement for boots on the ground (THERE) will decrease. An important thing to do to stabilize our national defense posture will be for the Congress to be more discriminating in how it supports Presidential requests for authorization of military action elsewhere.
I wouldn’t go to the extreme of calling drafted conscripts “useless”. But I do think it’s naive, at best, to say that the motivation and dedication level of conscripted troops will always be the equal of volunteer troops. The nature of the cause to be fought will always be a major factor in this, but even in the American Revolution where the survival of the idea of freedom, and a lifestyle free of oppressive British reprisals was at stake, even there conscripted militias took nearly all opportunities to desert and defect from the ranks. The greatest victory in World War II was the way in which the FDR government stated the case for war to the American people. That was unprecedented in propaganda success, and has not been beaten since. Now, unless you can promise an FDR administration at every turn, to convince us that the threat we are facing is a real, no-shit risk of foreign nationals doing the old school raping and pillaging routine in American cities, I seriously DOUBT that a conscripted force will be anywhere near worth the resources expended on training them, equipping them, and babysitting them out in the field.
Replace Dubya if you must (and yes, you MUST), but don’t replace methodologies of meeting manpower requirements which have shown to work in recent history.
I am not only a veteran, but a former Manpower Analyst who was attached to the Joint Chiefs. “If you build it, they will come”. The “it” to be built is a sufficient budget, sufficient motivation of the civilian population as to the cause to be fought, and sufficient leadership in the field to convince people they will not be throwing their own lives away by joining up. If the war itself is a mistake, both a volunteer force AND a drafted force, will fail.
I won’t be quoting Sun Tzu “this” time around, though I could. ;)
Ciggy: Quoting Sun Tzu is a good thing. Pick a quote and post it.
As for the troop strength problem, its darned if you do and darned if you don’t. No troops mean you are in danger of an invasion, but having them available means some dipstick will send them on a Christian Jihad or prospecting for oil. It’s kind of like keeping a loaded gun in the nightstand. It’s a great idea right up to the point when the accidental shooting occurs.
To bad we ignore the constitution and keep going to war with out actually declaring war.
Gaelen, I don’t understand your post. You seem to criticize the Administration for not sending enough troops, then you point out that if we sent the “right” amount, we’d be worse off. I have some guesses about what you mean, but I’d rather understand how you see it. Thanks!
-Cf
Posted by: Christopher Fahey at July 8, 2004 02:32 PMBob J, I like your analogy of the loaded gun on the night stand. That is exactly what a large standing conventional military force is. It makes you more able to rapidly meet conventional threats when they occur, but the downside is that it also makes it easier to generate some disastrous situations, when not thinking clearly (e.g., when you have Jethro Bodine for President).
A large reserve force is like keeping a similar gun in a locked cabinet. There may be some delay in some situations (putting more emphasis on early warning of threats), but the process of going to it and “unlocking” it (declaration of war, funding, the call-up, etc.) is a deliberate enough process where you are less likely to make fatal and catastrophic errors of judgment with it.
Sun Tzu quote of the day:
A major military operation is a severe drain on the nation, and may be kept up for years in the struggle for one day’s victory. So to fail to know the conditions of opponents because of reluctance to give rewards for intelligence is extremely inhumane, uncharacteristic of a true military leader, uncharacteristic of an assistant of the government, uncharacteristic of a victorious chief. So what enables an intelligent government and a wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishments is foreknowledge.Posted by: Ciggy at July 8, 2004 04:00 PM
While the troops eat sand, take benefit cuts and become defacto draftees, Haliburton’s & Bechtel’s boys make up to $1000 day as mercenary body guards and truck drivers…. The White House scum accuse doubting Thomas’s of treason while profiting from unnecessary death and war.
Posted by: bayviking at July 9, 2004 09:56 AMSome more Sun Tzu is in order:
The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, taking advantage of others’ failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard.
In general, the pattern of invasion is that invaders become more intense the farther they enter alien territory, to the point where the native rulership cannot overcome them.
Glean from rich fields, and the armies will have enough to eat. Take care of your health and avoid stress, consolidate your energy and build up your strength. maneuver your troops and assess strategies so as to be unfathomable.
Put them in a spot where they have no place to go, and they will die before fleeing. If they are to die there, what can they not do? Warriors exert their full strength. When warriors are in great danger, then they have no fear. When there is nowhere to go they are firm, when they are deeply involved they stick to it. If they have no choice, they will fight.
For this reason the soldiers are alert without being drilled, enlist without being drafted, are friendly without treaties, are trustworthy without commands.
Prohibit omens to get rid of doubt, and soldiers will never leave you. If your soldiers have no extra goods, it is not that they dislike material goods. If they have no more life, it is not that they do not want to live long. On the day the order to march goes out, the soldiers weep.
So a skillful military operation should be like a swift snake that counters with its tail when someone strikes at its head, counters with its head when someone strikes at its tail, and counters with both head and tail when someone strikes at its middle.
The question may be asked, can a military force be made to be like this swift snake? The answer is that it can. Even people who dislike each other, if in the same boat, will help each other out in trouble.
Therefore, tethered horses and buried wheels are not sufficently reliable.
To even out bravery and make it uniform is the Tao of organization. To be successful with both the hard and soft is based on the pattern of the ground.
Therefore those skilled in military operations achieve cooperation in a group so that directing the group is like directing a single individual with no other choice.
The business of the general is quiet and secret, fair and orderly.
He can keep the soldiers unaware, make them ignorant.
He changes his actions and revises his plans, so that people will not recognize them. He changes his abode and goes by a circuitous route, so that people cannot anticipate him.
When a leader establishes a goal with the troops, he is like one who climbs up to a high place and then tosses away the ladder. When a leader enters deeply into enemy territory with the troops, he brings out their potential. He has them burn the boats and destroy the pots, drives them like sheep, none knowing where they are going.
To assemble armies and put them into dangerous situations is the business of generals. Adaptations to different grounds, advantages of contraction and expansion, patterns of human feelings and conditions — these must be examined.
Generally, the way it is with invaders is that they unite when deep in enemy territory but are prone to dissolve while on the fringes. When you leave your country and cross the border on a military operation, that is isolated ground. When it is accessible from all directions, it is trafficked ground. When penetration is deep, that is heavy ground. When penetration is shallow, that is light ground. When your back is to an impassable fastness and before you are narrow straits, that is surrounded ground. When there is nowhere to go, that is deadly ground.
So on a ground of dissolution, I would unify the minds of the troops. On light ground, I would have them keep in touch. On a ground of contention, I would have them follow up quickly. On an intersecting ground, I would be careful about defense. On a trafficked ground, I would make alliances firm. On heavy ground, I would ensure continuous supplies. On bad ground, I would urge them onward. On surrounded ground, I would close up the gaps. On deadly ground, I would indicate to them there is no surviving.
So the psychology of soldiers is to resist when surrounded, fight when it cannot be avoided, and obey in extremes.
Therefore those who do not know the plans of competitors cannot prepare alliances. Those who do not know the lay of the land cannot maneuver their forces. Those who do not use local guides cannot take advantage of the ground. The military of an effective rulership must know all these things.
When the military of an effective rulership attacks a large country, the people cannot unite. When its power overwhelms opponents, alliances cannot come together.
Therefore if you do not compete for alliances anywhere, do not foster authority anywhere, but just extend your personal influence, threatening opponents, this makes town and country vulnerable.
Give out rewards that are not in the rules, give out directives that are not in the code.
Employ the entire armed forces like employing a single person. Employ them with actual tasks, do not talk to them. Motivate them with benefits, do not tell them about harm.
Confront them with annihilation, and they will then survive; plunge them into a deadly situation, and they will then live. When people fall into danger, they are then able to strive for victory.
So the task of a military operation is to accord deceptively with the intentions of the enemy. If you concentrate totally on the enemy, you can kill its military leadership a thousand miles away. This is skillful accomplishment of the task.
So on the day war is declared, borders are closed, passports are torn up, and emissaries are not let through.
Matters are dealt with strictly at headquarters.
When opponents present openings, you should penetrate them immediately. Get to what they want first, subtly anticipate them. Maintain discipline and adapt to the enemy in order to determine the outcome of the war. Thus, at first you are like a maiden, so the enemy opens his door; then you are like a rabbit on the loose, so the enemy cannot keep you out.
Posted by: Ciggy at July 9, 2004 10:33 AMCiggy,
You make a compelling argument vis-à-vis the large standing Army; if we didn’t have one perhaps we would nt be at war now. But once War is joined, it is incumbent upon us to do everything in our collective power to win it with the lowest cost of life possible.
And no, reservist did not sigh up fro a Greek vacation, but they did not sign up for the full-time Army either. There is balance to be stuck; right now there is an imbalance that threatens both the regular Army and the Guard and Reserve.
Mr. Martin, a story was released this morning indicating the Pentagon officials no longer believe we can win in Iraq, because new information reveals that the majority of insurgents are not fighting for an Islamic state, but, to rid their soil of Americans, and their numbers are now estimated at 20,000 broken into small decentralized groups of about 40 members and they are Iraqi’s capable of using home turf advantage - not foreign al-Queda or terrorists as the Administration would have us believe. If the Pentagon is conflicted about whether we can win our objectives there, we should damn well be making plans to pull out, or we risk proving Iraq is a 2nd Viet Nam to the rest of the world as well as our inability to learn from our past mistakes due to the blinding light of awesome power.
Posted by: David R. Remer at July 9, 2004 05:59 PMIt’s nearly unanimous among Iraqis that they don’t want America to be a permanent presence there. Where Iraqis are themselves conflicted or disagree with one-another, is the nature of the current American presence and whether it represents a law-and-order support to a transition toward a sovereign Iraqi regime, at which time the U.S. forces will leave, or whether U.S. forces intend to stay as a subtle occupational force always one step behind and to the right of any native Iraqi government.
Not all American action is oppressive there, and so not all Iraqis consider interim and temporary American action to have an unjust basis.
With all of the above being said, it should be said more firmly and succinctly that anyone with a brain in the centers of American power should have known that the MINUTE “major hostilities” with the Saddam regime ceased, we would be on the clock in terms of wearing out our welcome. There would be no time to dilly-dally and figure out how to restore law and order, how to restore utilities and infrastructure, and how to transition toward popular elections of a new democratic Iraq.
If we were not prepared to win the peace (and it’s apparent we weren’t), then we were not prepared to wage the war. That is a damnation of W which is on the most solid ground, of all possible critiques of the administration.
Whether insurgencies succeed or fail, is a function of whether they have both popular support at home, and some degree of material support from abroad.
Vietnam: popular support in the villages, and material support from Russia.
Afghanistan (versus USSR occupation): popular support, and material support from America.
Contras (versus Daniel Ortega): Material support from America, but not popular support at home (therefore, they failed).
American Insurgency (against the British): popular support at home, and eventually material support from France (without which it’s doubtful we would have prevailed).
Native American resitance to white settlers: Popular support among tribes out on the prairie, but no material assistance from elsewhere. They literally starved into failure to push back the “white eyes”.
Nazi “Wolfpack” insurgents after the fall of the Third Reich: popular support had faded at home, and nobody offered material support. That was them all over.
…………………………..
..and so on..
…………………………..
Anyway, this Iraqi insurgency must be examined under the same microscope: is it popularly supported? Probably so, inasmuch as people desperately want home rule under a native Iraqi flag, and consider one year to have been more than enough time for America to get its shyte together in preparing elections and leaving. In a word, yes. Do they have material support from elsewhere? Well, the number of countries willing to do so are legion. Hell, Michael Moore would probably fund it out of his movie earnings, if no one else.
All of that bodes very ill for the idea of being on the other side of the rebel guns.
Special Ops and CIA should still be active in Iraq in a clandestine fashion, with plausible deniability that they’re operating there, but the visible conventional force should be gone, gone, and gone.
All this junk about the bad information by the CIA is irrelevant. The 130,000 troops were stationed with all defense items. When the president heard there was no WMDs he rushed to start the war with the 130,000 troops that overwhelmed the Iraqis. The huge bombing in Bagdad was effort to kill Hussein. My theory is when Iraqis saw the power of the US Air was equal to A-Bomb in Japan and just quit fighting. The stupid president decided it was a sign of resignation and declared the war over. The hundreds of our soldiers that were killed should have some restitution and the members of the administration that started this abdomination should be held accountable. 82 yrs, WW2 vet.
Posted by: Abe Bucksner at July 11, 2004 01:31 PMWhat the President “heard” wasn’t that there were no WMDs, but that Iraq would allow the inspectors back in to inspect in an unrestricted fashion. My theory is that when Iraq made that new invitation of the inspectors, they had completed their clandestine elimination of all their WMDs. I think Saddam calculated that he could goad W into attacking him, and thus gain the propaganda victory which he obviously did win in the hearts and minds of Europe, and in …Abe Bucksner.
Even from the crawl space of a spider hole in Tikrit, Saddam won. Jethro Bodine lost. That’s the power of psyops.
And after 50+ years of studying this field, the U.S. still doesn’t “get it”.
Posted by: Ciggy at July 11, 2004 10:59 PM
